The narrative threads that weave through our collective consciousness are seldom neutral. They are spun with purpose, dyed in the colors of ideology, and often controlled by those who hold editorial power in society. The question “Who controls the narrative?” echoes through the halls of history, implying a contest not only of stories but of power. Ideologies – those broad systems of belief and value – do not float freely of their own accord; they are propagated through cultural mechanisms, with editorial content across domains like fashion, politics, and news media serving as both conduit and shaper. From ancient sages and scribes to modern editors and media moguls, those who curate and disseminate narratives have wielded profound influence over the mindset of societies. As Karl Marx famously observed in the 19th century, “The ruling ideas of each age have ever been the ideas of its ruling class” . This pithy maxim suggests that the dominant ideology of any era tends to align with the interests of those in power, in part because they have the means to promulgate their worldview through prevailing narrative channels.
Yet the power over narratives is never absolute nor uncontested. Human beings are, as anthropologist Clifford Geertz wrote, “an animal suspended in webs of significance [they themselves have] spun” . Culture itself is made up of these “webs” – networks of meaning and belief sustained through stories, symbols, and practices. The control of editorial content is essentially the control of which strands in this web are reinforced and which are left to wither. Throughout history, narratives have been constructed and curated by authorities to reinforce certain values and social orders. In parallel, counter-narratives have continually emerged from dissidents, reformers, and avant-garde thinkers to contest those dominant threads. The interplay between hegemonic narratives and subversive ones defines the evolution of ideology over time. We must examine this dynamic through multiple lenses – anthropological, philosophical, sociological – for it is at these interdisciplinary crossroads that we can discern the mechanisms by which editorial authority shapes cultural, political, and aesthetic values.
In every epoch, controlling the narrative has been a strategic means of consolidating power and justifying the status quo. The advent of the printing press in the fifteenth century dramatically expanded the battlefield of narrative. Once, knowledge and news had trickled down slowly through handwritten manuscripts guarded by clerical elites, but print technology broke that monopoly. Suddenly, dissenting ideas could spread with unprecedented speed. The Protestant Reformation offers a vivid example: Martin Luther’s fiery propositions against Church doctrines, which might have been stifled in an earlier age, were mass-printed as pamphlets and woodcut-illustrated broadsheets, circulating widely across Europe. These pamphleteers – the proto-journalists of their day – wrested the narrative from the Vatican’s grasp and enabled a new vision of Christianity to take hold. The printing press allowed Evangelical reformers “to do what had been previously impossible: quickly and effectively reach a large audience with a message intended to change Christianity,” issuing “thousands of pamphlets discrediting the old faith and advocating the new” . Empires and churches could no longer control what was being “heard,” and Luther’s challenge to authority spread faster and further than could ever have been imagined. In the centuries that followed, print culture continued to facilitate ideological upheavals. Enlightenment thinkers in the 18th century published essays and gazettes that chipped away at the divine-right narratives of absolutist regimes. Salons and coffeehouses buzzed with the latest pamphlets by Voltaire or Rousseau, as a literate bourgeois public sphere took shape, contesting the narratives imposed from above. Revolutionaries became masters of editorial influence: one cannot imagine the American Revolution of 1776 without Thomas Paine’s electrifying pamphlet Common Sense, which framed the rebellion as destiny and reportedly sold over 100,000 copies in just a few months . Likewise, during the French Revolution, papers and pamphlets like Jean-Paul Marat’s L’Ami du Peuple stoked the fires of change, urging citizens to reject the royalist story of divine order and instead embrace liberty, equality, and fraternity as the guiding ideology. In each case, those who controlled or successfully challenged the editorial channels of their time were able to reshape prevailing ideas – eroding the “naturalness” of the old order’s story and persuading people that another world was possible.
Even after such seismic shifts, the struggle for narrative control persisted. Consider the realm of politics and statecraft. From the chronicles inscribed on ancient palace walls to the proclamations in early modern gazettes, rulers understood that shaping the narrative was akin to shaping reality in the public mind. There is truth in the adage that history is written by the victors. Winston Churchill, himself a historian as well as a politician, once quipped: “History will be kind to me for I intend to write it.” Such remarks acknowledge that the narratives of the past are often edited by those who emerge on top; their version of events becomes the official history and a pillar of the prevailing ideology. Medieval European monarchs, for example, relied on court historians and town criers under their patronage to spread accounts that legitimized the divine right of kings. In Imperial China, the first Emperor of Qin, legend holds, went so far as to burn books and bury dissenting scholars to eliminate competing accounts and solidify an official ideology. In every epoch, authorities have poured resources into controlling their story, knowing that controlling the narrative is a key to legitimizing power.
George Orwell distilled this historical pattern into a chilling slogan in his dystopian novel 1984: “Who controls the past, controls the future: who controls the present, controls the past.” The totalitarian Party in Orwell’s fiction quite literally rewrote past newspapers and records to align history with its present political agenda – a dramatic embodiment of editorial manipulation used to maintain ideological control. And if Orwell’s vision was imagined, real 20th-century regimes proved how frighteningly accurate it could be. Authoritarian governments from Stalin’s Soviet Union to Hitler’s Third Reich employed vast propaganda machines to enforce their preferred narratives. The news media, literature, and even art and fashion in such societies were pressed into the service of an official ideology. Hannah Arendt, reflecting on the nature of totalitarian rule, noted that once a free press is lost, anything can happen: “What makes it possible for a totalitarian or any other dictatorship to rule is that people are not informed; how can you have an opinion if you are not informed? If everybody always lies to you, the consequence is not that you believe the lies, but rather that nobody believes anything any longer… And a people that no longer can believe anything cannot make up its mind. It is deprived not only of its capacity to act but also of its capacity to think and to judge.” In this observation, Arendt captures a paradox of narrative control – the aim may not always be to instill one single unwavering belief, but to muddy the waters so thoroughly with falsehood and confusion that the public eventually gives up on distinguishing truth at all. When the sense of reality is eroded, a cynical populace becomes prone to apathy or uncritical acceptance, leaving them pliable in the hands of whoever wields the loudest narrative. Total narrative domination can thus hollow out the very faculty of judgment in a population – a fact well understood by demagogues and tyrants.
Even in open societies where freedom of expression is formally protected, narrative control does not vanish – it merely takes on more insidious forms. The contest of ideologies shifts to subtler battlegrounds: the news report, the editorial column, the televised debate, the social media feed. As early 20th-century commentator Walter Lippmann observed, the real world is often too complex to grasp directly, and we largely live in what he called a “pseudo-environment,” a “subjective, biased, and necessarily abridged mental image of the world” – we “live in the same world, but… think and feel in different ones” . Media institutions act as sense-makers; they frame what events mean and even which events merit attention in the first place. Thus, editorial choices – what to highlight or omit, how to contextualize an issue – guide the public imagination. We end up, as Lippmann put it, thinking in pictures made by others rather than directly sensing reality. The American political scientist Bernard Cohen famously summed up this agenda-setting power by noting that the press “may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about.” Through countless decisions on headlines and story placement, media editors determine the issues that loom large in the public consciousness and those that fade into oblivion. This power to shape the public’s issue agenda is a profound form of ideological influence: it sets the boundaries of perceived reality within which all further debate occurs. In other words, by spotlighting certain topics and omitting others, editors provide the mental map on which public life is navigated, delineating where debate can roam and where silence reigns.
The emerging twentieth-century industries of public relations and advertising took these insights a step further – explicitly engineering narratives to influence mass psychology. Edward Bernays, a pioneer of public relations, candidly described this enterprise in 1928: “The conscious and intelligent manipulation of the organized habits and opinions of the masses is an important element in democratic society… those who manipulate this unseen mechanism of society constitute an invisible government which is the true ruling power” . Bernays, a nephew of Sigmund Freud, understood that tapping into unconscious desires and fears was key to controlling the public mind. He and other early “spin doctors” orchestrated everything from corporate marketing campaigns to government propaganda, often blurring the line between informing the public and molding their perceptions. (It was Bernays who helped popularize a hearty bacon-and-eggs breakfast on behalf of pork producers, and who promoted World War I in America as a crusade to “make the world safe for democracy.”) If Lippmann worried about the pictures in people’s heads, Bernays was busy painting those pictures. In Bernays’ vision, society’s cohesion depended on wise elites steering public opinion through well-crafted narratives. It was a benevolent rationale for what was essentially mass ideological management – foreshadowing just how pervasive and calculated narrative control would become in the modern age.
Even the ideal of journalistic objectivity cannot escape deeper ideological currents. By deciding what is “newsworthy” or which voices are given a platform, editors participate in constructing a kind of social reality. Pierre Bourdieu pointed out that television, as a dominant medium, “enjoys a de facto monopoly on what goes into the heads of a significant part of the population and what they think” . Such concentration of communicative power means that those who manage mainstream media wield disproportionate influence over society’s storyline. Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, in their analysis of the political economy of mass media (famously dubbed the propaganda model in their book Manufacturing Consent), described the news system as operating through filtering mechanisms that serve elite interests. They argued that the mass media “serve as a system for communicating messages and symbols to the general populace. It is their function to… inculcate individuals with the values, beliefs, and codes of behavior that will integrate them into the institutional structures of the larger society” – and that in a “world of concentrated wealth and major conflicts of class interest,” fulfilling this role “requires systematic propaganda.” According to their model, a series of institutional filters – from media ownership and advertising pressure to reliance on government sources and the disciplining force of “flak” – naturally limit the range of acceptable discourse . The raw material of the news, as they vividly put it, passes through successive filters “leaving only the cleansed residue fit to print” . Within such constraints, journalists may operate with integrity and believe they are objective, yet the structure of the system ensures that only certain perspectives see the light of day. What is presented as objective news is thus, often unconsciously, tailored to reinforce the ideological status quo. Chomsky and Herman note that “alternative bases of news choices are hardly imaginable” within the mainstream framework . In this way, what passes as “free” or independent media can, without any overt censorship, end up steadily channeling thought in directions favorable to entrenched powers. The press may be free in name, but if it is harnessed by subtle economic and social interests, it risks becoming an instrument of consensus rather than a forum of critique.
The power of editorial framing is acutely visible in times of war and crisis, when governments often seek to tighten their grip on the narrative. It has been said that in war, truth is the first casualty, and history provides ample evidence. Democratic states are not exempt from propaganda – during World War I, for instance, the British and American governments curated horror stories (some fabricated) of enemy atrocities to shore up public support, while suppressing news that might dampen enthusiasm. In World War II, both Allied and Axis powers – with Nazi Germany bringing propaganda to an aesthetic zenith through grandiose films like Leni Riefenstahl’s Triumph of the Will – managed newsreels and radio broadcasts to maintain morale and demonize the foe. With the advent of television, the Vietnam War became a turning point: it was dubbed the “living room war” as graphic footage of combat and casualties brought grim reality home to millions. For the first time, the state’s narrative of steady progress was visibly contradicted by images of napalm-charred villages and flag-draped coffins. Public outcry grew, and by 1968 even prominent news anchor Walter Cronkite felt compelled to editorialize that the war had become unwinnable. The U.S. government learned a lesson – in subsequent conflicts, greater control was exerted. During the 1991 Gulf War, media coverage was tightly stage-managed; the press mostly relayed Pentagon briefings and sanitized footage of “smart bombs,” presenting the conflict almost like a bloodless video game. In the 2003 Iraq War, the Pentagon’s strategy of “embedded journalism” allowed reporters to travel with military units but at the cost of seeing the war only through the soldiers’ perspective. The result was coverage that often adopted the troops’ viewpoint and terminology, blunting critical scrutiny. Only later, through independent reporting and leaked documents, did alternative narratives – of missing weapons of mass destruction, of civilian casualties and abuses like Abu Ghraib – emerge to challenge the initial patriotic storyline. The first casualty of war is indeed truth, and only a vigilant, inquisitive press (and public) can resuscitate it. These episodes demonstrate that even when a free press exists on paper, powerful actors will attempt to manage the arc of events. Whether they succeed depends on the persistence of investigative journalists and the willingness of citizens to question the official story. It is a stark reminder that truth in wartime is often not simply delivered to the public; it must be actively sought – sometimes in direct opposition to the narrative packaged by authorities.
The Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci provides a useful theoretical lens to understand how ideology endures even under conditions of free debate. Gramsci introduced the concept of cultural hegemony – the idea that a ruling class maintains power not only through force or laws, but by engineering a consensus worldview in society. The institutions that disseminate ideas (schools, churches, media, the arts) gradually normalize the values and perspectives of the powerful until they become “common sense” for all. In a succinct description of this process, one summary of Gramsci’s theory notes: “Cultural hegemony… consists of [the ruling class’s] beliefs, explanations, perceptions, values, and mores, which have become the accepted cultural norm… justifying the social, political, and economic status quo as natural and inevitable… Hegemonic culture propagates its own values and norms so that they become the ‘common sense’ values of all and thus maintain the status quo” . In a democratic society, then, the role of editorial institutions is pivotal in either bolstering or challenging this hegemony. When mass media uncritically echo the assumptions of the powerful, they help weave those assumptions into the fabric of common sense. Conversely, when journalists and editors give space to alternative perspectives, they can jolt the public into recognizing that social arrangements are contingent and changeable. Gramsci reminds us that established power has a head start in defining the discourse – but also that hegemony is never absolutely secure. What is accepted as common sense today might be denounced as unjust tomorrow if critics find a platform to speak. It is through such cracks in the edifice of “received wisdom” that transformative ideologies can begin to take shape.
Crucially, narratives within the media are sites of contestation. Sociologist Stuart Hall emphasized that the struggle over meaning is continuous; power in society tries to “fix” meanings to uphold the existing order, whereas oppositional voices seek to subvert and reinterpret those meanings. Hall observed that ideological power works to “close language, to close meaning, to stop the flow” – in other words, to naturalize certain interpretations so that alternatives become almost unthinkable. For example, if the mainstream press consistently frames a protest movement as a threat to “law and order,” that framing may foreclose the possibility of seeing it as a fight for justice. The editorial decision in such a case is far from neutral: it is encoding a value judgment into the narrative. And yet meaning never truly stops flowing; audiences can, and often do, decode messages in ways not intended by the senders – especially when they have access to counter-narratives. In modern pluralistic societies, for every dominant storyline there are alternative tellings circulating in smaller publications, community media, or online. The grand narrative of “law and order” can be challenged by personal stories of injustice; the label of “radical” can be worn as a badge of courage by those espousing change. The narrative that prevails at scale may indeed tilt toward the interests of the powerful, but it must constantly reckon with voices that resist closure. So long as alternative media or subcultures exist to carry forward a dissenting interpretation, the dominant meaning can be unmade and remade. The meaning of events is never truly final as long as people can find channels to express a different view.
If sociology and media studies illuminate these processes on the ground, philosophy steps back to question the very nature of truth and narrative. Michel Foucault, a thinker deeply concerned with power and knowledge, argued that each society creates regimes of truth – defining what is accepted as “true,” and recognizing only certain authorities and channels as legitimate producers of truth . “Truth is a thing of this world,” Foucault wrote, produced by constraint and by “the mechanisms… which enable one to distinguish true and false statements” . The media and other institutions continuously reinforce this “general politics” of truth by privileging some narratives and disqualifying others. Consider how, during the Cold War, the prevailing regime of truth in American media excluded socialist viewpoints as illegitimate or dangerous – an ideological boundary policed not always by state censorship, but by consensus among editors and experts about what ideas were acceptable. In parallel, the Soviet press dismissed liberal capitalist ideas as false bourgeois propaganda. In each sphere, editorial gatekeepers were upholding a regime of truth aligned with a political ideology. Foucault’s insight was that power and knowledge are entangled: controlling the narrative (controlling what counts as true) is a means of controlling people’s reality . Yet, as Foucault also reminds us, power is not monolithic – where it reinforces, it also “undermines and exposes… renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart” . Every regime of truth contains the seeds of its challenge, as marginal discourses and contradictions nibble at its edges. Power, by defining truth, attempts to freeze meaning; but the very act of imposing a narrative draws the attention of those who would question it. Discourse, Foucault observed, “transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it” . The battle for truth is therefore not for Truth in the absolute sense, but a battle over who gets to decide what truth is.
Philosophers have long recognized that what we call “reality” is to some extent narrativized – filtered through interpretive frameworks. Friedrich Nietzsche provocatively put it as “there are no facts, only interpretations.” While not a denial of physical reality, this bold claim is a reminder that all human understanding is mediated by perspective and prior belief. It implies that among the many possible ways to narrate the world, the one that gains dominance does so not necessarily because it is the most truthful or just, but because it is backed by the strongest social forces – the most influence, wealth, or authority. Whichever interpretation prevails at a given time is, as Nietzsche (through later paraphrase) suggested, a function of power, not necessarily of intrinsic truth . We can see this in something as commonplace as economic news: when a recession hits, one narrative frames it as a natural cycle requiring austerity and discipline; another narrative might blame policy failures and call for helping those hurt. The dominant media interpretation often reflects the perspective of financial and political elites, treating austerity as common sense. Alternative interpretations – perhaps voiced by labor activists or heterodox economists – struggle for airtime. It becomes a contest of interpretations in which power (economic, political, editorial) plays the decisive role in determining which story becomes the received wisdom. We are prompted to ask: whose story is this, and who benefits from us believing it?
Throughout modern history, nearly every social movement has understood the importance of controlling the narrative, or at least challenging the dominant one. Abolitionists before the U.S. Civil War, for example, produced fiery anti-slavery newspapers and pamphlets to counter the complacent or pro-slavery narrative in mainstream politics. Frederick Douglass – once enslaved and later the editor of his own abolitionist paper The North Star – championed free speech as “the dread of tyrants” and insisted that slavery could not tolerate an unfettered press. Women’s suffrage activists, too, started their own periodicals (such as The Revolution published by Susan B. Anthony and Elizabeth Cady Stanton) when traditional newspapers marginalized their cause. Labor unions in the late 19th and early 20th centuries launched worker-oriented journals that reframed stories of “riots” as righteous strikes for dignity, directly contesting the narrative put forth by company-owned newspapers. Each of these movements recognized that lasting change required winning hearts and minds – and that meant seizing editorial initiative. In many cases, the alternative press of reform movements eventually forced the mainstream press to reckon with new ideas. What begins at society’s margins – a radical pamphlet, a samizdat mimeograph sheet passed hand to hand under a repressive regime, or an online zine – can, if it strikes a chord, grow into an ideological wave that the major outlets must acknowledge. Time and again, the outsider narrative of one era becomes the orthodoxy of the next. What was radical dissent in one generation – abolitionism, feminism, civil rights – becomes common sense in another, after relentless editorial campaigns force society to confront injustices. In this way, the controlled narrative of one generation (say, that women belong in the domestic sphere, or that colonialism is a civilizing mission) can be upended by the next generation’s concerted editorial efforts to tell a different story.
The domain of fashion and aesthetics provides a seemingly apolitical but profoundly influential theater for narrative and ideology. Fashion might appear at first glance as merely a matter of style or personal taste, but it has long been entwined with statements of power, identity, and social order. In many societies, clothing has been regulated through sumptuary laws or strict norms precisely because what people wear can subvert or reinforce hierarchies – consider how aristocracies once forbade commoners from wearing certain colors or fabrics, literally controlling the visual narrative of class on the street. In the modern era, fashion editors and magazines became the new arbiters of these visual and cultural narratives. A magazine like Vogue not only reports on trends but actively defines glamour, beauty, and desirability for millions of readers, effectively telling society: this is what is in, this is how to be. These edicts carry implicit ideological messages about gender roles, body image, race, and consumerism. For instance, the silhouettes and styles promoted after World War II spoke volumes about gender ideology. In 1947, designer Christian Dior unveiled the “New Look” – a dramatic ensemble of cinched waists and billowing skirts that presented a highly feminized image of women, a stark departure from the functional, masculine attire women had worn during the war years. This editorially celebrated fashion “offered a glamorous, feminine look” following the austerity of wartime garb . The subtext of the New Look’s enthusiastic reception in magazines and advertisements was a reassertion of traditional femininity and domesticity after a period when women had taken on more public roles. It was as if the fashion establishment were collectively declaring it time for women to return to “normal,” reestablishing the pre-war social order through style. Not everyone embraced this narrative – some women, especially those who had grown accustomed to wartime practicality and autonomy, resented the New Look’s implications. (American women even staged protests, decrying the voluminous skirts as wasteful or retrograde.) The pushback was itself covered in the press, framing the debate as one of tradition versus modernity in womanhood. In the pages of Vogue and Harper’s Bazaar, the politics of gender and identity were being played out in silk and taffeta – a reminder that even what one wears can carry political weight.
Fashion editors can also challenge prevailing ideology, intentionally or not. The aesthetic of the 1960s “Youthquake,” for example, as championed by boutiques and magazines in London and New York, broke with the prim standards of the 1950s and mirrored a broader cultural revolt. Hemlines rose shockingly high; men grew their hair long – these sartorial shifts, heralded in bold fashion editorials, symbolized rebellion against old social norms. (One might recall the scene in The Devil Wears Prada where a cynical assistant’s cerulean sweater is revealed to have been chosen two years earlier by designers and editors – a witty dramatization of how even casual clothing choices trickle down from editorial decisions made on high.) As Roland Barthes noted, even the most everyday consumer items carry mythic meanings. “The cultural work done in the past by gods and epic sagas is now done by laundry-detergent commercials and comic-strip characters,” he wrote, pointing to how modern advertising and media create a mythology around products and lifestyles that shape our desires and beliefs . In the glossy pages of fashion spreads, beyond the fabrics and poses, a vision of life is being sold. For decades such magazines featured a narrowly defined ideal of beauty – young, ultra-thin, and often light-skinned – implicitly teaching society which bodies and faces are deemed desirable. Many readers internalized these standards (sometimes with damaging effects on their self-image and health). Only in recent years have some editors begun to diversify the image of beauty, an ideological shift toward inclusivity born of social pressure and changing narratives around body positivity. Still, in each era, the fashion narrative carries deeper values. In short, style is never “just style” – it is a social script, and those who publish and glorify certain looks effectively dictate how society visualizes concepts like elegance, masculinity, femininity, or modernity. When a fashion magazine in the 1970s began showcasing the “natural” look (less makeup, more diverse models), it was not just a trend but part of a wider ideological wave of feminism and self-acceptance. Conversely, when an editorial today overly retouches models to unrealistic perfection, it quietly forwards an ideology of unattainable beauty that keeps consumers dissatisfied and thus more pliant to the next product pitch. The aesthetics of style are saturated with power relations, and editors are the narrators who – through their curatorial choices – reinforce or challenge the ideals of their time.
Modern mass media blurs the lines between news and entertainment, politics and fashion, high art and pop culture – and across all these spheres, editorial narrative holds sway. Images, in particular, have become potent carriers of ideology in an age dominated by visual media. The French theorist Guy Debord, writing in 1967, observed the rise of what he called “the society of the spectacle,” in which “the spectacle is not a collection of images; it is a social relation between people that is mediated by images.” In this spectacle-society, mediated representations (on television, in advertisements, on social media feeds) become our primary way of relating to reality and to each other. (It is the modern equivalent of ancient Roman emperors’ strategy of providing “bread and circuses” to placate the masses with entertainments.) Editorial control over these images – which ones are shown, repeated, glorified, or suppressed – therefore becomes a form of social control. The spectacle, Debord argued, serves to distract and pacify, offering endless images of what we could buy, whom we should envy or emulate, and what we ought to fear, all the while alienating us from genuine lived experience . Think of how the continuous loop of celebrity gossip and glamorous Instagram posts constructs an ideology of aspiration and distraction, or how the televised spectacle of militaristic pageantry can make war seem like theater devoid of human cost. Those in charge of producing and editing these spectacles hold the power to normalize certain values: consumerism, competition, superficial beauty, nationalist fervor – values that keep the existing structures in place. And yet, as Debord and others in the avant-garde Situationist movement knew, the spectacle can also be détourned – subverted and turned against itself through art and satire that expose its artificiality. Avant-garde artists, radical journalists, and satirists throughout the 20th century seized editorial tools to craft counter-narratives. Dadaists in World War I published nonsense manifestos and absurdist journals to mock the propaganda of warring nations; in the 1960s, underground newspapers with psychedelic art and irreverent commentary challenged the tidy narratives of postwar prosperity; more recently, internet memes and guerrilla digital edits have been used to undermine political messaging. The arena of culture becomes a tug-of-war between complacency and critique. Each new technology that broadens reach – from the rotary press to radio to YouTube – is first exploited to extend the spectacle, and then inevitably seized by dissenters to shatter the spectacle’s façade. Art and media, in other words, are constantly engaged in a contest between narratives that reinforce the status quo and those that seek to disrupt it.
Anthropology adds yet another dimension, reminding us that narrative and ideology are fundamentally tied to ritual and meaning-making in human societies. Consider how each culture has its foundational myths and cautionary tales, passed down through oral tradition long before the era of mass media. These stories around campfires or in ceremonial gatherings were the editorials of their time – encoding moral lessons and social norms in memorable narrative form. The elders or priests who decided which tales to tell held the community’s ideological reins. In modern societies, the role of mythic storytelling is often played by mass media and education: our movies, our school textbooks, our national holidays all transmit narratives about who we are and what we value. Every culture selectively emphasizes certain themes. For example, 19th-century America popularized tales of the “self-made man” (through the rags-to-riches stories of Horatio Alger and others) to celebrate individual striving and reinforce an ethos of personal responsibility, whereas the Soviet Union mythologized the heroic proletarian worker and the collective farm to glorify communal effort and sacrifice. In a secular sense, national narratives (the “American Dream,” or the French ideal of Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité) function as mythic touchstones that guide a society’s self-image and political direction. These are promulgated through political speeches, school curricula, monuments and media editorials that reflect on the nation’s character. Our national and cultural identities, after all, are built on stories we tell about our collective past and purpose. When such stories become too narrow or distorted – excluding significant portions of the population or whitewashing injustices – conflict ensues. Only by rewriting the narrative can a more equitable understanding take root. A powerful illustration of contested narrative is the discourse around colonialism and representation. For centuries, colonial powers crafted a narrative of the colonized as “civilizationally inferior” or “exotic others” in need of dominion. Travelogues, academic treatises, and press reports – effectively the editorials of empire – reinforced this ideology. Edward Said famously analyzed this in Orientalism, describing it as a “Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient” . By controlling the scholarly and popular narrative about Asian and Middle Eastern peoples, colonial powers created an image of the “Orient” that justified their political and economic subjugation of those regions. The fight against colonial ideology, therefore, required not only political independence movements but also intellectual decolonization – reclaiming the narrative. Writers and activists from colonized societies began publishing their own histories and accounts, reframing the story from the perspective of the colonized. Frantz Fanon, for instance, in The Wretched of the Earth (1961) urged his people to reject the colonizer’s degrading myths and speak their truth. In effect, throwing off colonial rule required also rejecting the colonizer’s story – an epistemic revolution wherein suppressed voices could finally be heard on their own terms. Decolonization was thus not only a geopolitical fact but an ideological and narrative one: an old story was dismantled and a multitude of new ones began to bloom.
As we navigate further into the twenty-first century, the question of “who controls the narrative?” has become even more complex. The digital age shattered many traditional editorial gatekeepers. Where once a handful of publishing houses and broadcast networks curated the flow of information and culture, now the internet allows almost anyone to broadcast a narrative to the world. This democratization of content creation has enabled historically marginalized voices to be heard and to form communities around alternative narratives. Social media platforms have hosted grassroots movements – from the Arab Spring uprisings to #MeToo and Black Lives Matter – that used bottom-up storytelling to challenge the narratives presented by entrenched authorities. In these cases we see how ideology itself can be shifted by compelling personal narratives that catch fire virally, forcing the mainstream media (and society at large) to reckon with them. However, the digital landscape has also brought new forms of narrative manipulation. Algorithms crafted by social media companies now function as invisible editors, determining which posts and headlines each person sees and often amplifying sensational, emotionally charged content while filtering out nuance. In parallel, authoritarian governments have adapted to the digital arena by erecting new firewalls and propaganda channels – China’s “Great Firewall,” for instance, cordons off its domestic internet to block outside viewpoints and ensure the party line dominates, and various regimes deploy armies of online trolls and bots to drown out dissenting voices. And private firms have gotten involved as well: the notorious Cambridge Analytica scandal revealed how personal data from social networks could be used to micro-target political propaganda, effectively tailoring narratives so that individuals are subtly influenced in ways they hardly detect. In early 2021, these private platforms even took unprecedented steps into overt editorial action: Twitter and Facebook banned a sitting U.S. president for inciting violence and spreading falsehoods – a controversial assertion of corporate power over the public narrative. This new reality blurs the line between a platform and a publisher, raising hard questions about accountability and free expression in the digital public square.
The democratization of narrative is thus a double-edged sword: it liberates expression but also eliminates the traditional gatekeepers that once filtered blatant falsehoods. We find ourselves in a paradoxical era. Never have more narratives been available at our fingertips, yet finding a trustworthy thread in the labyrinth is ever more challenging. In cyberspace, wildly divergent worldviews can thrive, each with its own internally coherent logic and “facts.” The proliferation of fake news and pseudo-scientific claims, spread by clickbait and algorithmic engagement, has undermined the idea of a shared baseline of truth. In this cacophony, objective facts often compete on unequal footing with emotionally charged fictions. Meanwhile, opportunistic leaders and groups harness social media’s reach to flood the public sphere with their own talking points, overwhelming opposing voices by sheer volume. Many people choose the narratives that suit their biases, or disengage entirely, ceding the field to the loudest voices. The question then arises: how can truth reclaim its weight in an environment where lies travel so freely? It may require a reassertion of editorial responsibility (through diligent fact-checking, content moderation, and journalistic ethics), but also a citizenry better attuned to spotting manipulation and bias. Indeed, Oxford Dictionaries felt the pulse of the times when it declared “post-truth” its 2016 Word of the Year – defined as circumstances “in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief” . We are living in a “post-truth” predicament, and the way forward is uncertain. The struggle over narrative in the digital age thus occurs on a new frontier, but it is a direct descendant of the older battles we have traced – it is the age-old fight to determine what is real and what is illusory, now playing out in the code of social networks and the cacophony of online discourse.
Ultimately, the dance between editorials and ideology is an endless one. It has shaped empires and revolutions, social norms and fashion trends, what we accept as common sense and what we reject as heresy. We live our lives enveloped in narratives constructed for us, yet we also possess the capacity to question and reshape those narratives. History provides both cautionary tales of unchecked narrative control and inspiring examples of narrative liberation. The pen, the printing press, the pixel – these have been the instruments of authority and of rebellion alike. Thus, the narrative of society is never truly static; it is an ongoing conversation, a terrain of struggle over meaning. Those who have power will always attempt to script the story to their advantage, but there will always be others who counter with stories of their own.
If there is an antidote to the subtle tyranny of a single narrative, it lies in the plurality of voices and the freedom to argue. Nearly four centuries ago, the poet John Milton wrote, “Give me the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely according to conscience, above all liberties.” This timeless plea reminds us that the control of narrative must always be contested if we are to remain free. As long as there are critical minds willing to question what they are told and imaginative voices spinning new threads of meaning, the narrative will never be wholly owned by the powerful. Instead, it remains a dynamic human tapestry – one that we collectively write, unwrite, and rewrite in our continuing search for truth and justice.